Cycling testing and Vote Trading in the Iranian Economy; The Case of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Competition Council

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Payame nur University

2 Payame Nur University

Abstract

Public choice theory, assuming that citizens and policymakers primarily seek to maximize their personal benefits, uses economic methodology to analyze political behavior and actions. Public choice faces fundamental difficulties, and answering the essential question of collective choice—namely, which option is socially preferable to others—is not easily achievable. Although Arrow’s impossibility theorem highlighted the inherent challenges in attempting to aggregate collective preferences fairly and consistently, in addition to the issues Arrow raised, the aggregation of collective preferences also faces problems such as cycles and vote trading. The aim of this paper is to examine the existence of cycles and vote trading in collective decision-making in Iran. Theoretical foundations and empirical findings confirm the possibility of cycles in committees, and observations indicate the widespread use of vote trading in committee decisions, which often significantly impacts the outcomes and policymaking processes to the benefit of certain groups. Therefore, using data related to the allocation of development budgets and the budgets of medical universities to the provinces, the occurrence of cycles in the budget distribution process is examined. The results do not provide convincing evidence of cycles in the allocation of development and medical university budgets among the provinces. The absence of cycles over an eight-year period indicates a degree of stability and predictability in the budget distribution process and shows that past allocations heavily influence current allocations. Additionally, considering two cases presented in the Competition Council and using the full information maximum likelihood method, vote trading in the mentioned committee is tested. Although no evidence of vote trading was found in the Competition Council, the findings indicate a lack of independence among the voting topics and the influence of voting on different topics on each other. Furthermore, individual characteristics, beliefs, and ideologies of the members regarding the size and importance of their respective organizations have a much greater impact on their voting behavior.

Keywords

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History

  • Receive Date: 20 August 2024
  • Revise Date: 20 October 2024
  • Accept Date: 15 January 2025

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