National Political Parties and the Shaping of Voter Behavior in Parliamentary Elections, A Game Theory Approach

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD Student in Islamic Studies and Economics, Faculty of Islamic Studies and Economics, Imam Sadiq University (AS), Tehran, Iran.

2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Islamic Studies and Economics, Imam Sadiq University

3 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Islamic Studies and Economics, Imam Sadiq University

Abstract

The design of an electoral system can influence voters’ incentives and, consequently, the performance of the legislative institution. In electoral systems based on geographical constituencies, voters’ and representatives’ concentration on short-term and local interests may lead to inefficient allocation of public resources and undermine national and long-term interests. This study employs public choice theory and game theory to conceptualize this problem as a form of the “tragedy of the commons” and examines the role of national political parties in changing the resulting equilibrium. The study adopts a theoretical-analytical approach and uses static and dynamic games with an infinite horizon to identify the underlying incentive mechanisms. In the model, voters’ preferences within each constituency are aggregated through majority voting or the median-voter mechanism into a collective orientation toward local and national interests. The results of the baseline game show that, in the absence of a coordinating institution, each constituency has an incentive to extract a greater share of public resources in pursuit of short-term and local benefits. In equilibrium, this behavior reduces investment and leads to a collectively inefficient outcome. Moreover, as the number of electoral constituencies increases, the critical discount rate required to sustain cooperation rises, while coordination problems and free-riding become more severe. By contrast, national and inclusive political parties that provide a platform for communication and coordination, as well as internal monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, reduce the gains from unilateral deviation and lower the threshold required to sustain cooperative equilibrium. The findings therefore suggest that national political parties can serve as institutions for coordinating dispersed voter preferences and aligning local interests with national interests. Accordingly, strengthening the party system, alongside other institutional reforms, can constitute one potential mechanism for reducing regional incentives and improving the performance of the legislative system.

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References

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History

  • Receive Date: 14 February 2026
  • Revise Date: 22 August 2026
  • Accept Date: 23 August 2026

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